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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
         In United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 
1990), we held that a sentencing court has authority to depart 
downward under the Sentencing Guidelines by analogy to the 
adjustment for Mitigating Role in the Offense if defendant would 
have been entitled to that adjustment had the supplier, an 
undercover postal inspector, been a criminally culpable 
participant.  In this case we are asked to consider whether 
Bierley should be extended to a defendant charged and convicted 
of a single-person offense. 
                                I.      
                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
         In May 1995, Appellee Romeo Romualdi ordered a catalog 
by mail from L.G. Enterprises, a business that sold pornographic 
materials.  Unknown to Romualdi, L.G. Enterprises had recently 
been the subject of a federal investigation and was taken over by 
the Postal Inspection Service.  The following month Romualdi 
ordered two videotapes from L.G. Enterprises.  One of the tapes 
was entitled "First Fuck," and was described in the catalog as 
"Twelve Year Old Girl Has Sex With A Man For The First Time In 
Her Life."  The second tape was entitled "Wash Time," and was 
described as "Eleven Year Old Girl Bathes With Woman, Have Sex 
Together and With A Man."  Romualdi requested that the tapes be 
sent to his home in Lebanon, Pennsylvania but that they be 
addressed to "Superior Merchandise" rather than to him in his own 
name. 
         On July 6, 1995, the tapes were delivered to Romualdi's 
residence while postal inspectors maintained surveillance of the 
delivery.  Romualdi received the tapes, and ten minutes later the 
investigators searched his home pursuant to a federal search 
warrant.  During the search they found that the two tapes that 
had just been delivered to Romualdi were in a garbage can covered 
with newspaper.  A further search revealed more pornographic 
material.  The inspectors found two more tapes that purported to 
be depictions of nudist colonies, in which the camera focused 
upon the genitals of young girls.  They also found thirteen 
pornographic videos depicting adult women dressed as girls.  
Romualdi also had pasted the faces of young girls, which he 
obtained from a Sears catalog, over the faces of women in the 
photographs of adults having sex.  The inspectors also found a 
video entitled "Fallen Angel," which the presentence report 
describes as "a non-pornographic movie dramatizing the sexual 
relationship be[twe]en an adult male and a twelve year old girl 
whom the male lures into child pornography."  
         Romualdi told the postal inspectors that when he 
ordered the two tapes from L.G. Enterprises he believed that they 
would be like the other tapes he owns in which the people in the 
tape were all over eighteen and were only dressed like children.  
He stated that he had started to view the tapes but had thrown 
them away because of their poor quality.  He also stated that the 
reason why he had the tapes addressed to "Superior Merchandise," 
rather than his own name, was to avoid embarrassment if the 
packages had broken open while being transported through the 
mails.  When questioned about the pictures with the girls' faces 
pasted to them, Romualdi admitted that he fantasized about young 
girls having sex.    
         After consulting an attorney, Romualdi signed a plea 
agreement with the government.  Pursuant to that agreement, 
Romualdi pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing three or more 
videotapes containing child pornography, a crime under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(4).  Child pornography is defined as material "which 
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct."  18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A).  Romualdi also agreed to 
provide the government with information that would be useful in 
future investigations relating to child pornography.  The 
government agreed not to bring any more charges against Romualdi 
and agreed to seek the sentencing term available under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
         The United States Parole Office calculated Romualdi's 
base offense level at 13 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4(a), 
"possession of child pornography."  Because some of the tapes in 
Romualdi's possession depicted girls under the age of twelve,  
the base level was increased by two to 15, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
2G2.4(b)(1).  The level was then lowered two points because of 
Romualdi's acceptance of responsibility, thereby bringing the 
total offense level to 13.  Because Romualdi had no previous 
criminal record, the sentencing range for level 13 was calculated 
at twelve to eighteen months.  The presentence report stated that 
consistent with this court's decision in United States v. 
Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061 (3d. Cir. 1990), the district court could 
depart two or four levels from the total offense level by analogy 
to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, if the court determined that Romualdi was a 
minimal or minor participant in the offense. 
         The presentence report noted that Romualdi had been in 
the Army for two years, had a good family background and had a 
good relationship with his 26 year old daughter, who was born 
from Romualdi's five year cohabitation with a girlfriend.  None 
of those questioned was able to explain the conduct leading to 
the offense.   
         At the suggestion of the probation officer, Romualdi 
underwent a psychological evaluation by Roy Smith, Ph.D., 
Executive Director of Pennsylvania Counseling Services.  In his 
report, Dr. Smith suggested that Romualdi suffered from a 
moderately severe dependent personality disorder with prominent 
obsessive compulsive traits, and that he needed to be seen in a 
good light by other people but had isolated himself from society.  
The doctor believed that Romualdi viewed pornographic films 
because of this isolation - as a way to feel closer to society - 
and he indicated that Romualdi's interest in pornographic films 
with child themes "may signify a developmental arrest or sexual 
addiction."  Dr. Smith concluded that time in jail would be 
counterproductive as it would only increase Romualdi's isolation 
from his already limited social network and exacerbate his 
psychological condition.  In addition, incarceration would 
interfere with Romualdi's operation of the pool hall and t-shirt 
store that he owns, thus creating additional financial stress 
which could lead to further psychological isolation.  Instead, 
the doctor recommended that Romualdi be placed on probation and 
forced to attend group therapy for sexually addictive and child 
molesting individuals.   
         At Romualdi's sentencing, which took place in district 
court on January 16, 1996, the government followed the plea 
agreement and recommended the minimal sentence available under 
the applicable sentencing range, twelve months in jail.  The 
court, however, departed from the Guidelines, citing as authority 
our opinion in Bierley, and reduced Romualdi's total offense 
level by three, from 13 to 10, finding by analogy to § 3B1.2 of 
the Sentencing Guidelines that the defendant's conduct qualified 
for a mitigating role reduction.  Using the new offense level of 
10, the court sentenced Romualdi to three years probation, six 
months of which would be spent in home confinement, and a $5,000 
fine.   The United States appeals. 
         We have jurisdiction over the government's appeal from 
the district court's judgment of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(b) (1993) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1993). 
                               II. 
                        STANDARD OF REVIEW 
         In its recent opinion in Koon v. United States, 116 
S.Ct 2035, 2043 (1996), the Supreme Court held that in reviewing 
appeals from a district court's decision to depart from the 
sentencing ranges in the Sentencing Guidelines, "[t]he appellate 
court should not review the departure decision de novo, but 
instead should ask whether the sentencing court abused its 
discretion."  Id. at 2043.  Nonetheless, the appellate court 
retains the obligation to correct mistaken legal conclusions.  As 
the Supreme Court stated in Koon: 
         [W]hether a factor is a permissible basis for departure 
         under any circumstances is a question of law, and the  
         court of appeals need not defer to the district court's 
         resolution of the point.  Little turns, however, on  
         whether we label review of a particular question abuse  
         of discretion or de novo, for an abuse of discretion  
         standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond  
         appellate correction.  A district court by definition  
         abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.   
 
Id. at 2047 (citations omitted). 
 
         The government argues that the district court erred as 
a matter of law in concluding that it had the authority to depart 
downward from the guidelines under our holding in Bierley, and 
that our review is plenary.  The government's brief was filed 
before the Koon decision, but for practical purposes our review 
is the same under the abuse of discretion standard since we must 
examine what is, in substance, a legal issue. 
                               III. 
                            DISCUSSION 
                                A. 
         Bierley, upon which the district court and presentence 
report relied, involved the sentencing of a defendant who pled 
guilty to receipt of child pornography under circumstances 
similar, but not identical, to those involved here.  Like 
Romualdi, Bierley ordered materials that contained child 
pornography through the mail. See Bierley, 922 F.2d at 1063.  An 
undercover postal agent acted as the distributor of the materials 
-- four magazines depicting children in sexually-suggestive poses 
and involved in sexual activities -- and after the magazines were 
delivered, the postal inspectors conducted a search of Bierley's 
house. Id.  Unlike the search of Romualdi's residence, however, 
the inspectors found no other articles of child pornography 
except for the magazines that Bierley had received through the 
sting operation. Id. at 1064.  Bierley was arrested and 
eventually pleaded guilty to "willfully and knowingly receiving 
and causing to be delivered by mail, visual depictions of minors 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct," in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§2252(a)(2). Id. 
         At his sentencing hearing, Bierley contended that he 
was entitled to a downward adjustment in his sentence as a minor 
or minimal participant in the offense. Id.   Chapter 3, Part B, 
of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for adjustment of a 
defendant's offense level predicated on his or her role in the 
offense.  See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.7.  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 allows for a 
downward adjustment where a defendant acted as a minor or minimal 
participant in a concerted activity.  The Mitigating Role 
Guideline provides: 
         Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease  
         the offense level as follows: 
         (a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any  
              criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels. 
         (b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any  
              criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels. 
         In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by three 
         levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. 
 
         The district court declined to adjust Bierley's offense 
level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, holding that under the 
language of § 3B1.2, the mitigation is available only when the 
defendant is a minimal or minor "participant" in an offense that 
involves concerted activity.  See Bierley, 922 F.2d at 1066.  A 
"participant" is defined as a person who can be held "criminally 
responsible for the commission of the offense."  U.S.S.G. § 
3B1.1, comment. (n.1).  Bierley was the only "participant," 
inasmuch as the undercover postal inspector who sent the child 
pornography was not "criminally responsible" and there was no one 
else involved in the activity to whom Bierley could be compared 
for culpability.  See Bierley, 922 F.2d at 1066; see also United 
States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1402 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
Bierley for the rule that sections 3B1.1 and 3B1.2 only apply 
where there is more than one "participant" in the offense); 
United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 934 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(same). 
         On Bierley's appeal, we agreed that U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 
was not directly applicable if there was no more than one 
criminally responsible participant, but we nevertheless held that 
the district court did have the authority to depart downward from 
the Guidelines in that situation.  Relying on the principles 
underlying the Sentencing Commission's departure policy and the 
language in the Guidelines allowing for discretionary departure, 
see 18 U.S.C.A § 3553(b), U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, we held that district 
courts have the authority to apply the Guidelines by analogy in 
the rare cases when the basis for the departure is conduct 
similar to that encompassed in the "Role in the Offense" 
Guidelines but otherwise unavailable to the defendant.  Bierley, 
922 F.2d at 1068.  Where a case is atypical, or for some other 
reason falls outside of the scope of the cases considered by the 
Sentencing Commission in drafting the Guidelines, the district 
court may use analogic reasoning to allow a departure.  Id. at 
1067-69. 
         Bierley's situation was atypical because he was being 
denied the opportunity for mitigation under § 3B1.2 simply 
because the other person involved in the activity could not be 
considered a "participant" in the activity as defined by the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  See Bierley, 922 F.2d at 1068.  Thus, we 
instructed the district court that it could depart from the 
Guidelines and adjust Bierley's sentence in a manner analogous to 
§ 3B1.2 if the court believed Bierley's conduct would qualify as 
"minor" or "minimal" had the postal agent been a "participant." 
See id. at 1070; see also United States v. Stuart, 22 F.3d 76, 83 
(3d Cir. 1994) (in departing by analogy, "'the court predicts 
what level of punishment the Sentencing Commission would have 
assigned to the offense had it been considered...'.") (quoting 
United States v. Strickland, 941 F.2d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 614 (1991)). 
         The Second Circuit adopted the reasoning of Bierley in 
United States v. Speenburgh, 990 F.2d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1993), as 
did the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 
F.2d 643, 648 (9th Cir. 1992).    
         The government argues that this case is not analogous 
to Bierley.  The principal distinction that the government 
proffers is that unlike Bierley, who pled guilty to receipt of 
child pornography, Romualdi pled guilty to possession of child 
pornography.  The government argues that while the receipt of 
child pornography may be viewed as a concerted activity, to which 
§ 3B1.2 is or could be applicable if the party sending the 
material had not been a government agent, the possession of child 
pornography is a single-person offense, to which § 3B1.2 is 
inapplicable.  
         The government's argument is not merely technical.  
Both the relevant statute and the Sentencing Guidelines make a 
distinction between receipt and possession of child pornography.   
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a), which criminalizes certain activities 
in such materials that have been mailed, shipped or transported 
in interstate or foreign commerce, there is a distinction made 
among the types of activity with which the defendant is charged.  
Subsection (a)(1) covers any person who "knowingly transports or 
ships" such material.  Subsection (a)(2) covers any person who 
"knowingly receives or distributes" such material.  Subsection 
(a)(3) covers any person who "knowingly sells or possesses with 
intent to sell" such material.  Subsection (a)(4) covers any 
person who "knowingly possesses 3 or more copies of such 
material."   
         Those convicted of one of the first three subsections, 
those engaged in knowing transportation or shipment, receipt or 
distribution, and sale or possession with intent to sell, are 
subject to fine and/or imprisonment for not more than ten years 
for the first such conviction.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1).  In 
contrast, those covered by Subsection (a)(4), i.e., the knowing 
possession of the material, are subject to imprisonment for not 
more than 5 years, half the sentence of one convicted of knowing 
receipt.  See id. at (2). 
         The Sentencing Guidelines also differentiate between 
receipt of child pornography and mere possession.  Receipt, the 
more serious offense, carries an offense level of 15 whereas 
possession, rated less seriously, carries an offense level of 13.  
Compare U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 with U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4.  Before there can 
be an adjustment of the offense level under § 3B1.1 or § 3B1.2, 
the offense must be one that meets the threshold requirement of 
involving more than one criminally responsible participant.  As 
we explained, "[t]his follows because the adjustments authorized 
for role in the offense are directed to the relative culpability 
of participants in group conduct."  Bierley, 922 F.2d at 1065; 
see also United States v. Thompson, 990 F.2d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 
1993) (holding that defendant convicted of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm, a single-person offense, not entitled to 
mitigation under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2).    
         Departure was authorized in Bierley because Bierley's 
offense, receipt of child pornography, involved a concerted 
activity between himself and the sender and, but for the fact 
that the other persons involved in the offense were federal 
agents immune from criminal responsibility, Bierley would have 
been entitled to consideration for adjustment in offense level 
via a direct application of § 3B1.2.    
       The crime to which Romualdi pled guilty as charged, 
possession, not receipt, of child pornography, is a crime that on 
its face requires no concerted activity.  Although in almost all 
instances the possession followed receipt, they are different 
crimes as noted above.  Because the purpose of § 3B1.2 is to 
permit mitigation of the sentence of a defendant who is a minimal 
participant in an offense involving concerted activity, Romualdi 
would not have been entitled to an adjustment under § 3B1.2, even 
if the person that delivered the pornography had been criminally 
responsible.  
         Romualdi asserts that his simple act of possession was 
a minimal part of a larger distribution ring, a criminal scheme 
that was directed and controlled by other persons.  He reasons 
that had the other participants in the scheme not been undercover 
agents, he, like Bierley, would have been entitled to a reduction 
in sentence if it was determined that his role was minor or 
minimal pursuant to U.S.S.G § 3B1.2.  Romualdi is simply wrong in 
that claim because the offense of which he was charged and 
convicted was significantly less serious than warranted by his 
actual conduct.  Therefore, even had his conduct involved a 
concerted activity, he would have been ineligible for mitigation 
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. 
         Comment Four of the Guideline Commentary to U.S.S.G. § 
3B1.2 states in part: 
         If a defendant has received a lower offense 
         level by virtue of being convicted of an 
         offense significantly less serious than 
         warranted by his actual criminal conduct, a 
         reduction for a mitigating role under this 
         section ordinarily is not warranted because 
         such a defendant is not substantially less 
         culpable than a defendant whose only conduct 
         involved the less serious offense. 
                     
          U.S.S.G § 3B1.2, comment. (n.4). 
 
         This commentary, which was added by amendment in 1992, 
has not been the subject of any reported opinion by this court. 
Other courts of appeals, however, have determined that a 
reduction under § 3B1.2 is unavailable to a defendant in 
Romualdi's situation.  See United States v. Windom, 82 F.3d 742, 
748 (7th Cir. 1996) (defendant not convicted of larger drug 
conspiracy not entitled to reduction under § 3B1.2); United 
States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 556 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United 
States v. Olibrices 979 F.2d 1557, 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (same).  
         A contrary rule would permit a defendant to claim s/he 
played a minimal part in a more serious offense in order to 
obtain a reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, even though the more 
serious offense was not taken into account in setting the initial 
base offense level in the first place.  Not only would such a 
rule contravene the purposes of the "Mitigating Role in the 
Offense" Guideline, which is designed to temper the injustice of 
treating unequally culpable defendants the same for sentencing 
purposes, it also leads to 
         the absurd result that a defendant involved both as a  
         minor participant in a larger distribution scheme for  
         which she was not convicted, and as a major participant 
         in a smaller scheme for which she was convicted, would  
         receive a shorter sentence than a defendant involved  
         solely in the smaller scheme. 
 
Olibrices, 979 F.2d at 1560. 
 
         Here, Romualdi pled guilty to possession of child 
pornography pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4), and therefore he 
obtained the benefit of a lower base offense level then had the 
crime been receipt of child pornography.  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 is 
simply unavailable, by analogy or otherwise, under these 
circumstances.  For the reasons set forth above, we must vacate 
the district court's judgment of sentence and remand to the 
district court for resentencing. 
                                B. 
         Our holding that the district court's departure in this 
case was one that had no basis in the law because § 3B1.2 would 
not have been applicable in any event does not preclude the 
district court from considering departure on another ground.  
This matter came before the district court for sentencing before 
the Supreme Court announced its decision in Koon which clarified 
the grounds upon which a district court may and may not depart. 
The Court explained in Koon that the availability of departure 
depends on whether the special factor used by the district court 
as a basis for departure is an "encouraged" factor because it is 
one that "the Commission has not been able to take into account 
fully in formulating the Guidelines," a "discouraged" factor, or 
one that is unmentioned in the Guidelines.  Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 
2045 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
         The Court noted that if the factor is one that is 
encouraged, the sentencing court is authorized to depart if the 
applicable guideline does not already take it into account.  In 
contrast, a discouraged factor is not ordinarily relevant to the 
determination of whether a sentence should be outside the 
applicable guideline range, and therefore should be relied upon 
only "in exceptional cases."  Id.  Finally, in discussing a 
factor that is not mentioned at all, the Court stated that the 
sentencing court had authority, after considering the "'structure 
and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the 
Guidelines taken as a whole,' . . . to decide whether it is 
sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline's heartland."  
Id. at 2045 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 941, 949 
(1st Cir. 1993) [an opinion by then Judge, now Justice, Breyer]). 
The Court thus recognized a flexibility in departure that may not 
have been hitherto fully appreciated by the district courts. 
          In this connection, we note that Romualdi has 
apparently completed his service of the most stringent part of 
the sentence imposed by the district court, i.e. home confinement 
for six months.  On remand, the district court may want to 
consider whether this is a factor that would warrant departure.  
A similar situation arose in United States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 
552 (9th Cir. 1993), where the sentencing court had departed on 
the ground that the defendant had two children who would be 
placed at potential risk, a factor that was found by the Court of 
Appeals to have been improper inasmuch as the Commission had 
concluded it is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether to 
depart.  Id. at 553; see United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116, 
121 (3d Cir. 1991).  Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals noted that 
the defendant had almost finished serving her six months of home 
detention at the time the district court held a second sentencing 
hearing, a fact also cited by the district court in departing 
from the applicable guideline range.  The Court of Appeals 
stated, in language equally relevant here: 
         We agree it may have been proper to depart 
         because of the six months of home detention 
         Miller had already served.  The fact that 
         she'd already been punished to some extent is 
         certainly relevant to what further sentence 
         is needed to punish her and deter others.  
         See 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(2) (sentence should 
         reflect these and other considerations).  And 
         because the Commission seems not to have 
         considered the issue of compensating for time 
         erroneously served, the district court was 
         free to depart.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).  
 
Miller, 991 F.2d at 554.  We agree. 
         We do not suggest that this is the only possible basis 
for departure, an inquiry that the Supreme Court emphasized in 
Koon is primarily within the discretion of the sentencing court. 
However, we do emphasize that departures based on grounds not 
mentioned in the Guidelines will be "highly infrequent."  Koon, 
116 S.Ct. at 2035 (quoting 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A).  As we 
observed in Bierley, departures not anticipated by the Sentencing 
Commission in promulgating the Guidelines should be resorted to 
only in the most "rare occurrences," Bierley, 922 F.2d at 1069; a 
sentencing court should be able to articulate "'what features of 
[the] case take it outside the Guideline's 'heartland' and make 
of it a special, or unusual, case.'"  Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2035 
(quoting Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949). 
                               IV. 
                            CONCLUSION 
         For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
judgment of sentence and we will remand this case to the district  
court for resentencing. 
 
 
